Classroom game on the theory of rent seeking - some practical
experience
The theory of rent-seeking is a central pillar of modern
public choice theory. It applies very abstract game-theoretic concepts
to model the competition of enterprises for governmental privileges.
Therefore it is difficult for a teacher to help the students to gain
an intuitive understanding of the phenomenon of rent-seeking. Goeree
and Holt have provided a valuable classroom game which illustrates
the fundamental mechanisms of this theory in a very vivid way. The
game and the major parallels to the phenomenon of rent-seeking are
presented in this paper. Based on our practical experience when applying
this game, we suggest two modifications of the set-up plus one extension
to the original game. The major results of a number of experiments
with the modified rules are discussed in detail.The auctions for UMTS-licenses
in Germany and Spain are presented as a real-life example for rent-seeking.